Cloud Token Theft Response
--- ## Cloud Token Theft Response Playbook The **Cloud Token Theft Response Playbook** provides a structured and comprehensive flow to effectively respond to and mitigate alerts involving the theft of cloud tokens. The playbook supports AWS, GCP, and Azure and executes the following: **Cloud Enrichment:** - Enriches the involved resources - Enriches the involved identities - Enriches the involved IPs **Verdict Decision Tree:** - Determines the appropriate verdict based on the investigation findings **Early Containment using the Cloud Response - Generic Playbook:** - Implements early containment measures to prevent further impact **Cloud Persistence Threat Hunting:** - Conducts threat hunting activities to identify any cloud persistence techniques **Enriching and Responding to Hunting Findings:** - Performs additional enrichment and responds to the findings from threat hunting **Verdict Handling:** - Handles false positives identified during the investigation - Handles true positives by initiating appropriate response actions ---
- Pack
- CloudIncidentResponse
- Tasks
- 42
Inputs
- alert_id — The alert ID.
- InternalRange — A list of internal IP ranges to check IP addresses against. The comma-separated list should be provided in a CIDR notation.
- ResolveIP — Determines whether to convert the IP address to a hostname using a DNS query (True/ False).
- earlyContainment — Whether to execute early containment. This action allows you to respond rapidly but have higher probability for false positives.
- VPNIPList — This input can process to types of data: 1. A comma separated list of IP addresses assigned by the VPN provider. (using a XSIAM list or an hardcoded array) 2. A comma separated list of CIDRs. 3. A link to an IP addresses list which will be processed and extract the IP dynamically with each execution.
- AWS-newInstanceProfileName — The new instance profile name to assign in the clone service account flow.
- AWS-newRoleName — The new role name to assign in the clone service account flow.
- AWS-roleNameToRestrict — If provided, the role will be attached with a deny policy without the compute instance analysis flow.
- shouldCloneSA — Whether to clone the compromised SA before putting a deny policy to it. Supports: AWS. True/False
- autoCredentialsRotation — Whether to rotate the identity credentials automatically.
- credentialsRemediationType — The response playbook provides the following remediation actions using AWS, MSGraph Users, GCP and GSuite Admin: Reset: By entering "Reset" in the input, the playbook will execute password reset. Supports: AWS, MSGraph Users, GCP and GSuite Admin. Revoke: By entering "Revoke" in the input, the GCP will revoke the access key, GSuite Admin will revoke the access token and the MSGraph Users will revoke the session. Supports: GCP, GSuite Admin and MSGraph Users. Deactivate - By entering "Deactivate" in the input, the playbook will execute access key deactivation. Supports: AWS. ALL: By entering "ALL" in the input, the playbook will execute the all remediation actions provided for each CSP.
Commands used
- closeInvestigation
- core-get-cloud-original-alerts
- setAlert