Analytics Alerts

Browse the Cortex analytics alert reference.

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213 alerts match the current filters. tactic: TA0003 ✕

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  • Unusual process access to ld.so.preload file Medium

    Attackers can modify ld.so.preload to inject malicious code into every dynamically linked process, enabling persistence and code execution. This detected operation is considered atypical in terms of access.

    Activation:
    14 Days
    Training:
    30 Days
    Test:
    N/A (single event)
    Deduplication:
    1 Day
    ATT&CK tactics: Persistence (TA0003)
    ATT&CK techniques: Hijack Execution Flow: Dynamic Linker Hijacking (T1574.006)
    Required data: XDR Agent with eXtended Threat Hunting (XTH)
    Attacker's goals: This allows attackers to inject malicious code into system processes, gain persistence, code injection, evade detection, and potentially escalate privileges.
    Investigative actions: Check whether the executing process is benign and if this was a desired behavior as part of its normal execution flow. Download the /etc/ld.so.preload file from the host and see if and what libraries are specified there. Download any library specified and see if it's benign.
  • Unusual resource modification by newly seen IAM user Informational Cloud 3 variations

    A cloud resource was modified by a newly seen IAM user.

    Activation:
    14 Days
    Training:
    30 Days
    Test:
    N/A (single event)
    Deduplication:
    5 Days
    ATT&CK tactics: Persistence (TA0003) Privilege Escalation (TA0004) Impact (TA0040)
    ATT&CK techniques: Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) Data Destruction (T1485)
    Required data: AWS Audit Log Azure Audit Log Gcp Audit Log
    Detector tags: OCI Analytics
    Attacker's goals: Leverage access to manipulate cloud infrastructure.
    Investigative actions: Examine which resources were affected and how. Investigate any unusual activity originating from the identity.

    Variations

    Unusual Kubernetes resource modification by newly seen IAM user

    Informational overridden

    A cloud resource was modified by a newly seen IAM user. overridden

    Unusual IAM resource modification by newly seen IAM user

    Low overridden

    A cloud resource was modified by a newly seen IAM user. overridden

    Unusual resource modification by newly seen IAM user from an uncommon IP

    Low overridden

    A cloud resource was modified by a newly seen IAM user. overridden

  • Unusual user account enablement Informational Identity Analytics 1 variation

    A user enabled an account. This user does not usually enable user accounts.

    Activation:
    14 Days
    Training:
    30 Days
    Test:
    N/A (single event)
    Deduplication:
    1 Day
    ATT&CK tactics: Persistence (TA0003)
    ATT&CK techniques: Account Manipulation (T1098)
    Required data: Windows Event Collector XDR Agent with eXtended Threat Hunting (XTH)
    Attacker's goals: An attacker may enable a user account to gain persistence.
    Investigative actions: Investigate the associated enabling event. Check if the user is authorized to enable accounts. Confirm that the account enablement was expected. If the account enablement seems suspicious, address it accordingly by disabling the account again, forcing a password change, or monitoring its activity.

    Variations

    Unusual sensitive user account enablement

    Low overridden

    A user enabled a sensitive account. This user does not usually enable user accounts. overridden

  • Unusual user-agent for a cloud identity Informational Cloud 1 variation

    A cloud identity has executed an API call with an unusual user-agent.

    Activation:
    14 Days
    Training:
    30 Days
    Test:
    N/A (single event)
    Deduplication:
    5 Days
    ATT&CK tactics: Initial Access (TA0001) Persistence (TA0003) Privilege Escalation (TA0004) Defense Evasion (TA0005)
    ATT&CK techniques: Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004)
    Required data: AWS Audit Log Azure Audit Log Gcp Audit Log
    Detector tags: OCI Analytics
    Attacker's goals: Evade detection by using non-standard tools or scripts.
    Investigative actions: Examine the recent actions of the user for any abnormal or unauthorized behavior. Verify if the user intentionally used a new device or tool.

    Variations

    Unusual user-agent for a cloud identity by a compromised AWS access key

    Medium overridden

    A cloud identity has executed an API call with an unusual user-agent. overridden

  • Unverified domain added to Azure AD Informational Identity Threat Module, SaaS Threat Detection 1 variation

    A new unverified domain was added to Azure AD.

    Activation:
    14 Days
    Training:
    30 Days
    Test:
    N/A (single event)
    Deduplication:
    1 Hour
    ATT&CK tactics: Persistence (TA0003)
    ATT&CK techniques: Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials (T1098.001)
    Required data: AzureAD Audit Log
    Attacker's goals: An attacker attempts to change Active Directory configuration for persistence or defense evasion.
    Investigative actions: Check if the new domain is known for the organization. Check whether the user changing the configuration is permitted. Monitor network activity to and from the added domain.

    Variations

    Rare unverified domain addition to Azure AD

    Low overridden

    A new unverified domain was added to Azure AD. overridden

  • User account delegation change Informational Identity Analytics 2 variations

    A user account was modified with delegation to a service.

    Activation:
    14 Days
    Training:
    30 Days
    Test:
    N/A (single event)
    Deduplication:
    1 Day
    ATT&CK tactics: Persistence (TA0003)
    ATT&CK techniques: Account Manipulation (T1098)
    Required data: Windows Event Collector XDR Agent with eXtended Threat Hunting (XTH)
    Attacker's goals: An attacker may attempt to control an Active Directory environment.
    Investigative actions: Verify this action with the user who performed the change. Check if the account modified is a service account. Follow actions by the user, including TGT and TGS requests. Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity.

    Variations

    User account delegation to KRBTGT

    High overridden

    A user account was modified with delegation to the KRBTGT service. overridden

    User account delegation to a DC

    Low overridden

    A user account was modified with delegation to a service on a domain controller. overridden

  • User added a new device to Okta Verify instance Informational Identity Threat Module, SaaS Threat Detection 1 variation

    The user has successfully registered a new device with the Okta Verify application.

    Activation:
    14 Days
    Training:
    30 Days
    Test:
    N/A (single event)
    Deduplication:
    1 Day
    ATT&CK tactics: Persistence (TA0003)
    ATT&CK techniques: Account Manipulation (T1098) Valid Accounts (T1078)
    Required data: Okta Audit Log
    Detector tags: Okta Audit Analytics
    Attacker's goals: Attackers may exploit the device registration process in Okta by registering unauthorized devices, thereby gaining access to sensitive resources and user accounts within an organization.
    Investigative actions: Reach out to the user responsible for the device registration to confirm its legitimacy. Examine the user's actions preceding and following the activation of the alert. Assess the reputation of the IP address along with that of the Autonomous System Number (ASN). Make sure the IP address is not showing any abnormal activity. Monitor the activity from the new registered device and ensure that it matches the user's normal activity.

    Variations

    Suspicious device enrollment to Okta

    Low overridden

    A new device was registered on Okta with suspicious characteristics, which increased the alert severity. overridden

  • User added to a group and removed Informational Identity Analytics 2 variations

    A user was added to an Active Directory group and removed within a short period of time, which may be a sign of compromise.

    Activation:
    14 Days
    Training:
    30 Days
    Test:
    10 Hours
    Deduplication:
    1 Day
    ATT&CK tactics: Persistence (TA0003) Privilege Escalation (TA0004)
    ATT&CK techniques: Account Manipulation (T1098) Valid Accounts (T1078)
    Required data: Windows Event Collector XDR Agent with eXtended Threat Hunting (XTH)
    Attacker's goals: Elevate permissions and establish persistence.
    Investigative actions: Verify the activity with the performing user. Confirm that the group addition was not accidental. Check for any suspicious actions performed by the added user. Check for a possible compromise of the initiating user.

    Variations

    Rare privileged group addition and removal

    Medium overridden

    A user was added to an Active Directory privileged group and removed within a short period of time, which may be a sign of compromise. overridden

    User added to a privileged group and removed

    Low overridden

    A user was added to an Active Directory privileged group and removed within a short period of time, which may be a sign of compromise. overridden

  • User added to the SMS Admins local group Low Identity Analytics 1 variation

    A user was added to the SMS Admins local group. This may indicate a potential attack targeting the Microsoft Configuration Manager infrastructure.

    Activation:
    14 Days
    Training:
    30 Days
    Test:
    3 Hours
    Deduplication:
    1 Day
    ATT&CK tactics: Persistence (TA0003) Privilege Escalation (TA0004)
    ATT&CK techniques: Account Manipulation (T1098) Valid Accounts (T1078)
    Required data: Windows Event Collector XDR Agent with eXtended Threat Hunting (XTH)
    Detector tags: Microsoft SCCM Analytics
    Attacker's goals: Gain administrative control over Microsoft Configuration Manager to facilitate lateral movement, deploy malicious payloads, or exfiltrate data.
    Investigative actions: Verify the activity with the performing user. Confirm that the group addition was not accidental. Review related logs (e.g., Active Directory, SCCM logs) to identify the source of the modification and associated accounts. Investigate the user's activity before and after the addition to determine if any unauthorized actions or privilege escalation attempts occurred.

    Variations

    User added to the SMS Admins group and removed

    Medium overridden

    A user was added to the SMS Admins group and removed within a short period of time, which may be a sign of compromise. overridden

  • User installed an application in Microsoft Teams via Graph API Informational Identity Threat Module, SaaS Threat Detection 1 variation

    A user who rarely uses the Graph API to install Microsoft Teams applications has installed one using it.

    Activation:
    14 Days
    Training:
    30 Days
    Test:
    N/A (single event)
    Deduplication:
    1 Day
    ATT&CK tactics: Persistence (TA0003)
    ATT&CK techniques: Cloud Application Integration (T1671)
    Required data: Microsoft Graph Logs
    Detector tags: Microsoft Teams
    Attacker's goals: Attackers may leverage Teams applications to maintain persistent access to compromised Teams accounts.
    Investigative actions: Verify the user's role and typical usage of Microsoft Graph API. Check if the user's account has recently logged in from unusual locations or devices. Review recent email and chat activity to identify any phishing or suspicious messages sent. Examine the Graph API call logs to see what actions were performed and their timestamps. Correlate with endpoint logs to detect any malware or suspicious processes running on the user's device. Check for signs of account compromise, such as password changes or MFA bypass attempts. Follow further actions done by the account.

    Variations

    User installed an application in Microsoft Teams via Graph API from a first seen ASN

    Low overridden

    A user who rarely uses the Graph API to install Microsoft Teams applications has installed one using it. overridden

  • Weakly-Encrypted Kerberos TGT Response Informational 1 variation

    A weakly encrypted Kerberos TGT was issued by a domain controller. The encryption type is abnormal for this DC and results in a TGT that is easier to crack. This behavior may indicate a Skeleton Key attack.

    Activation:
    14 Days
    Training:
    30 Days
    Test:
    N/A (single event)
    Deduplication:
    1 Day
    ATT&CK tactics: Credential Access (TA0006) Defense Evasion (TA0005) Persistence (TA0003)
    ATT&CK techniques: Modify Authentication Process: Domain Controller Authentication (T1556.001)
    Required data: Palo Alto Networks Firewall EAL Logs XDR Agent
    Attacker's goals: Manipulate the domain controller authentication process to bypass standard authentication and gain access to hosts and resources in environments relying on single-factor authentication.
    Investigative actions: Identify the user or entity that requested the TGT during the alert timeframe. Determine whether a legitimate service or application requested weak Kerberos encryption. Verify whether the domain controller is patched against the Skeleton Key vulnerability (CVE-2016-1567).

    Variations

    Abnormal Weakly-Encrypted Kerberos TGT Response

    Low overridden

    A weakly encrypted Kerberos TGT was issued by a domain controller. The encryption type is abnormal for this DC and results in a TGT that is easier to crack. This behavior may indicate a Skeleton Key attack. overridden

  • Web server CGO executed a process following a potential Webshell dropped Informational

    A process was executed by a web server CGO following a potential drop of a webshell file.

    Activation:
    14 Days
    Training:
    30 Days
    Test:
    4 Hours
    Deduplication:
    1 Day
    ATT&CK tactics: Persistence (TA0003)
    ATT&CK techniques: Server Software Component: Web Shell (T1505.003)
    Required data: XDR Agent with eXtended Threat Hunting (XTH)
    Detector tags: Webshell Analytics
    Attacker's goals: Gaining the ability to execute commands on the host, as well as persistence.
    Investigative actions: Investigate the web server access logs for suspicious behavior. Check if the dropped file contains malicious content.
  • Web server CGO executed an uncommon process Informational 1 variation

    An uncommon process was executed by a web server CGO, which might indicate a Webshell activity or a web server exploit.

    Activation:
    14 Days
    Training:
    30 Days
    Test:
    N/A (single event)
    Deduplication:
    1 Day
    ATT&CK tactics: Initial Access (TA0001) Persistence (TA0003)
    ATT&CK techniques: External Remote Services (T1133) Server Software Component: Web Shell (T1505.003)
    Required data: XDR Agent
    Detector tags: Webshell Analytics
    Attacker's goals: Gaining the ability to execute commands on the host, as well as persistence.
    Investigative actions: Investigate the web server access logs for suspicious behavior. Check if the executed process is malicious or executes a suspicious action.

    Variations

    Web server CGO executed a LOLBIN process with direct IP in the command line

    High overridden

    A LOLBIN process with a direct IP in the command line was executed by a web server CGO, which might indicate a Webshell activity or a web server exploit. overridden