Analytics Alerts
Browse the Cortex analytics alert reference.
6 alerts match the current filters. tactic: TA0002 ✕ technique: T1611 ✕
Show ATT&CK heatmapKubernetes Pod Created With Sensitive Volume Informational Cloud 3 variations
An identity created a Kubernetes Pod with a sensitive volume, allowing the Pod to have read or write permissions on the host's filesystemThis could suggest an effort by an adversary to access sensitive files on the host and employ techniques for escalating privileges.
- Activation:
- 14 Days
- Training:
- 30 Days
- Test:
- N/A (single event)
- Deduplication:
- 5 Days
ATT&CK tactics: Privilege Escalation (TA0004) Execution (TA0002)ATT&CK techniques: Escape to Host (T1611) Deploy Container (T1610)Required data: AWS Audit Log Azure Audit Log Gcp Audit Log Kubernetes Audit LogsDetector tags: Kubernetes - APIAttacker's goals: Gain access to the host's filesystem. Gain root access to the host.Investigative actions: Check the identity's role designation in the organization. Inspect for any additional suspicious activities inside the Kubernetes Pod.Variations
Kubernetes Pod Created With Sensitive Volume for the first time in the cluster
Low overridden
An identity created a Kubernetes Pod with a sensitive volume, allowing the Pod to have read or write permissions on the host's filesystemThis could suggest an effort by an adversary to access sensitive files on the host and employ techniques for escalating privileges. overridden
Kubernetes Pod Created With Sensitive Volume for the first time in the namespace
Low overridden
An identity created a Kubernetes Pod with a sensitive volume, allowing the Pod to have read or write permissions on the host's filesystemThis could suggest an effort by an adversary to access sensitive files on the host and employ techniques for escalating privileges. overridden
Kubernetes Pod Created With Sensitive Volume for the first time by the identity
Low overridden
An identity created a Kubernetes Pod with a sensitive volume, allowing the Pod to have read or write permissions on the host's filesystemThis could suggest an effort by an adversary to access sensitive files on the host and employ techniques for escalating privileges. overridden
Kubernetes Pod Created with host Inter Process Communications (IPC) namespace Informational Cloud 3 variations
An identity created a Kubernetes pod with the host Inter Process Communications (IPC) namespace.This may indicate an adversary attempting to access data used by other pods that use the host's IPC namespace.
- Activation:
- 14 Days
- Training:
- 30 Days
- Test:
- N/A (single event)
- Deduplication:
- 5 Days
ATT&CK tactics: Privilege Escalation (TA0004) Execution (TA0002)ATT&CK techniques: Escape to Host (T1611) Deploy Container (T1610)Required data: AWS Audit Log Azure Audit Log Gcp Audit Log Kubernetes Audit LogsDetector tags: Kubernetes - APIAttacker's goals: Access data used by other pods that use the host's IPC namespace.Investigative actions: Check the identity's role designation in the organization. Inspect for any files in the /dev/shm shared memory location. Inspect for any IPC facilities being used with /usr/bin/ipcs.Variations
Kubernetes Pod Created with host Inter Process Communications (IPC) namespace for the first time in the cluster
Low overridden
An identity created a Kubernetes pod with the host Inter Process Communications (IPC) namespace.This may indicate an adversary attempting to access data used by other pods that use the host's IPC namespace. overridden
Kubernetes Pod Created with host Inter Process Communications (IPC) namespace for the first time in the namespace
Low overridden
An identity created a Kubernetes pod with the host Inter Process Communications (IPC) namespace.This may indicate an adversary attempting to access data used by other pods that use the host's IPC namespace. overridden
Kubernetes Pod Created with host Inter Process Communications (IPC) namespace for the first time by the identity
Low overridden
An identity created a Kubernetes pod with the host Inter Process Communications (IPC) namespace.This may indicate an adversary attempting to access data used by other pods that use the host's IPC namespace. overridden
Kubernetes Pod created with host process ID (PID) namespace Informational Cloud 3 variations
An identity created a Kubernetes pod with the host process ID (PID) namespace.This may indicate an adversary attempting to access processes running on the host, which could allow escalating privileges to root.
- Activation:
- 14 Days
- Training:
- 30 Days
- Test:
- N/A (single event)
- Deduplication:
- 5 Days
ATT&CK tactics: Privilege Escalation (TA0004) Execution (TA0002)ATT&CK techniques: Escape to Host (T1611) Deploy Container (T1610)Required data: AWS Audit Log Azure Audit Log Gcp Audit Log Kubernetes Audit LogsDetector tags: Kubernetes - APIAttacker's goals: View processes on the host. View the environment variables for each pod on the host. View the file descriptors for each pod on the host. Kill processes on the node.Investigative actions: Check the identity's role designation in the organization. Inspect for any additional suspicious activities inside the Kubernetes Pod.Variations
Kubernetes Pod created with host process ID (PID) namespace for the first time in the cluster
Low overridden
An identity created a Kubernetes pod with the host process ID (PID) namespace.This may indicate an adversary attempting to access processes running on the host, which could allow escalating privileges to root. overridden
Kubernetes Pod created with host process ID (PID) namespace for the first time in the namespace
Low overridden
An identity created a Kubernetes pod with the host process ID (PID) namespace.This may indicate an adversary attempting to access processes running on the host, which could allow escalating privileges to root. overridden
Kubernetes Pod created with host process ID (PID) namespace for the first time by the identity
Low overridden
An identity created a Kubernetes pod with the host process ID (PID) namespace.This may indicate an adversary attempting to access processes running on the host, which could allow escalating privileges to root. overridden
Kubernetes Privileged Pod Creation Informational Cloud 3 variations
An identity created a Kubernetes pod with a privileged container.This may indicate an adversary attempting to access that host's filesystem or gain root access to the host.
- Activation:
- 14 Days
- Training:
- 30 Days
- Test:
- N/A (single event)
- Deduplication:
- 5 Days
ATT&CK tactics: Privilege Escalation (TA0004) Execution (TA0002)ATT&CK techniques: Escape to Host (T1611) Deploy Container (T1610)Required data: AWS Audit Log Azure Audit Log Gcp Audit Log Kubernetes Audit LogsDetector tags: Kubernetes - APIAttacker's goals: Gain access to the host's filesystem. Gain root access to the host.Investigative actions: Check the identity's role designation in the organization. Inspect for any additional suspicious activities inside the Kubernetes Pod.Variations
Kubernetes Privileged Pod Creation for the first time in the cluster
Low overridden
An identity created a Kubernetes pod with a privileged container.This may indicate an adversary attempting to access that host's filesystem or gain root access to the host. overridden
Kubernetes Privileged Pod Creation for the first time in the namespace
Low overridden
An identity created a Kubernetes pod with a privileged container.This may indicate an adversary attempting to access that host's filesystem or gain root access to the host. overridden
Kubernetes Privileged Pod Creation for the first time by the identity
Low overridden
An identity created a Kubernetes pod with a privileged container.This may indicate an adversary attempting to access that host's filesystem or gain root access to the host. overridden
Kubernetes pod creation with host network Informational Cloud 3 variations
An identity created a Kubernetes pod attached to the host network.This may indicate an adversary attempting to access services bound to localhost, sniff traffic on any interface on the host, and potentially bypass the network policy.
- Activation:
- 14 Days
- Training:
- 30 Days
- Test:
- N/A (single event)
- Deduplication:
- 5 Days
ATT&CK tactics: Privilege Escalation (TA0004) Execution (TA0002)ATT&CK techniques: Escape to Host (T1611) Deploy Container (T1610)Required data: AWS Audit Log Azure Audit Log Gcp Audit Log Kubernetes Audit LogsDetector tags: Kubernetes - APIAttacker's goals: Access services bound to localhost. Sniff traffic on any interface on the host. Bypass network policy.Investigative actions: Check the identity's role designation in the organization. Inspect for any unusual access to localhost services. Inspect for any network sniffing tool being used inside the Kubernetes Pod.Variations
Kubernetes pod creation with host network for the first time in the cluster
Low overridden
An identity created a Kubernetes pod attached to the host network.This may indicate an adversary attempting to access services bound to localhost, sniff traffic on any interface on the host, and potentially bypass the network policy. overridden
Kubernetes pod creation with host network for the first time in the namespace
Low overridden
An identity created a Kubernetes pod attached to the host network.This may indicate an adversary attempting to access services bound to localhost, sniff traffic on any interface on the host, and potentially bypass the network policy. overridden
Kubernetes pod creation with host network for the first time by the identity
Low overridden
An identity created a Kubernetes pod attached to the host network.This may indicate an adversary attempting to access services bound to localhost, sniff traffic on any interface on the host, and potentially bypass the network policy. overridden
Suspicious process execution in a privileged container Informational 1 variation
A process was executed in a privileged Kubernetes Pod for the first time in the past 30 days.
- Activation:
- 14 Days
- Training:
- 30 Days
- Test:
- N/A (single event)
- Deduplication:
- 1 Day
ATT&CK tactics: Execution (TA0002) Privilege Escalation (TA0004)ATT&CK techniques: Container Administration Command (T1609) Escape to Host (T1611)Required data: XDR AgentDetector tags: Kubernetes - AGENT, ContainersAttacker's goals: Perform lateral movement to new hosts to expand the foothold within a network and gain higher privileges.Investigative actions: Investigate the processes being spawned on the host for malicious activities. Correlate the command run from the host and understand which software initiated it.Variations
Suspicious process execution in a new privileged container
Informational overridden
A process was executed in a privileged Kubernetes Pod for the first time in the past 30 days. overridden