Analytics Alerts

Browse the Cortex analytics alert reference.

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3 alerts match the current filters. tactic: TA0003 ✕ technique: T1562 ✕

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  • A user modified an Okta policy rule Informational Identity Threat Module, SaaS Threat Detection 1 variation

    An Okta policy rule was modified by a user, suggesting a potential compromise of the account.

    Activation:
    14 Days
    Training:
    30 Days
    Test:
    N/A (single event)
    Deduplication:
    2 Days
    ATT&CK tactics: Defense Evasion (TA0005) Persistence (TA0003)
    ATT&CK techniques: Impair Defenses (T1562) Domain or Tenant Policy Modification (T1484) Modify Authentication Process (T1556)
    Required data: Okta Audit Log
    Detector tags: Okta Audit Analytics
    Attacker's goals: An attacker may attempt to modify an Okta policy rule to weaken an organization's security controls.
    Investigative actions: Follow further actions done by the account. Verify that the configuration change was expected. Look for signs that the user account is compromised (e.g. abnormal logins, unusual activity). Investigate if any other security policies have been changed or removed.

    Variations

    A user modified an Okta policy rule with suspicious characteristics

    Low overridden

    An Okta policy rule was modified by a suspicious user, suggesting a potential compromise of the account. overridden

  • Azure VM extension abuse attempt Informational Cloud 1 variation

    A suspicious Azure VM extension operation was detected. Attackers can use CustomScriptExtension to execute arbitrary scripts on VMs, VMAccessExtension to reset local passwords for persistence, or delete the IaaSAntimalware extension to disable antimalware protection and evade detection.

    Activation:
    14 Days
    Training:
    30 Days
    Test:
    N/A (single event)
    Deduplication:
    1 Day
    ATT&CK tactics: Execution (TA0002) Persistence (TA0003) Defense Evasion (TA0005)
    ATT&CK techniques: Cloud Administration Command (T1651) Command and Scripting Interpreter: Cloud API (T1059.009) Account Manipulation (T1098) Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001)
    Required data: Azure Audit Log
    Attacker's goals: Execute arbitrary code on VMs without network access (CustomScriptExtension). Gain persistent access by resetting local admin passwords (VMAccessExtension). Disable antimalware to deploy malware undetected (IaaSAntimalware deletion).
    Investigative actions: Identify the extension type involved (CustomScriptExtension, VMAccessExtension, IaaSAntimalware). For CustomScriptExtension: review the script payload executed on the VM. For VMAccessExtension: check if local admin credentials were reset and audit subsequent logins. For IaaSAntimalware deletion: verify the virtual machine audit log after the extension was removed. Verify whether the identity performing the operation is authorized to manage VM extensions. Check for correlated suspicious activity such as new role assignments or lateral movement.

    Variations

    Unusual azure VM extension abuse

    Low overridden

    A suspicious Azure VM extension operation was detected. Attackers can use CustomScriptExtension to execute arbitrary scripts on VMs, VMAccessExtension to reset local passwords for persistence, or delete the IaaSAntimalware extension to disable antimalware protection and evade detection. overridden

  • Microsoft Teams application setup policy was modified Informational Identity Threat Module, SaaS Threat Detection 1 variation

    Microsoft Teams the application setup policy, which is responsible for application management, was modified.

    Activation:
    14 Days
    Training:
    30 Days
    Test:
    N/A (single event)
    Deduplication:
    1 Day
    ATT&CK tactics: Defense Evasion (TA0005) Persistence (TA0003)
    ATT&CK techniques: Impair Defenses (T1562) Cloud Application Integration (T1671)
    Required data: Office 365 Audit
    Detector tags: Microsoft Teams
    Attacker's goals: Attackers may modify the application setup policy to maintain persistent access to compromised Teams accounts and conversations.
    Investigative actions: Determine if it is within the user's role to modify the policy. Verify whether the modification of the policy is both legitimate and necessary. If the policy change causes an application installed for the whole organization, confirm that the application was created by a certified and trusted entity. Correlate the event with its sign-in event to get additional information on the identity performing the action using the session ID or the unique token identifier.

    Variations

    A user changed the Microsoft Teams application setup policy for the first time

    Low overridden

    Microsoft Teams the application setup policy, which is responsible for application management, was modified. overridden