Analytics Alerts

Browse the Cortex analytics alert reference.

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10 alerts match the current filters. technique: T1557 ✕

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  • Machine Account NTLM Relay Low

    An NTLM NTProofStr was seen from more than one source. This indicates that machine account NTLM authentication data has been relayed.

    Activation:
    14 Days
    Training:
    30 Days
    Test:
    10 Minutes
    Deduplication:
    1 Day
    ATT&CK tactics: Credential Access (TA0006) Lateral Movement (TA0008)
    ATT&CK techniques: Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay (T1557.001) Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash (T1550.002)
    Required data: Palo Alto Networks Firewall traffic Logs XDR Agent
    Attacker's goals: The attacker is attempting a man-in-the-middle NTLM relay attack to intercept authentication attempts and move laterally within an environment.
    Investigative actions: Check that the alerted host is not a NAT or a proxy that duplicates traffic as part of its normal behavior. Check if the protocols used are vulnerable to an NTLM relay attack (e.g. LDAP, SMB). Ensure that SMB signing is enabled in the case of a possible SMB relay attack.
  • Multiple uncommon SSH Servers with the same Server host key Low

    Multiple uncommon SSH servers were observed using the same host key.

    Activation:
    14 Days
    Training:
    30 Days
    Test:
    N/A (single event)
    Deduplication:
    1 Day
    ATT&CK tactics: Credential Access (TA0006)
    ATT&CK techniques: Adversary-in-the-Middle (T1557)
    Required data: Palo Alto Networks Firewall EAL Logs XDR Agent
    Attacker's goals: Attackers may attempt to move laterally within the network by exploiting and relaying stolen client credentials to another SSH server.
    Investigative actions: Audit the authentication attempts to the SSH server using the same key. Look for unusual or repeated connections from the same or unexpected hosts. Audit Client Credentials, check for any signs of compromised client credentials being used on different SSH servers.
  • NTLM Relay Informational

    An NTLM NTProofStr was seen from more than one source. This indicates that NTLM authentication data has been relayed.

    Activation:
    14 Days
    Training:
    30 Days
    Test:
    10 Minutes
    Deduplication:
    1 Day
    ATT&CK tactics: Credential Access (TA0006) Lateral Movement (TA0008)
    ATT&CK techniques: Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay (T1557.001) Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash (T1550.002)
    Required data: Palo Alto Networks Firewall traffic Logs XDR Agent
    Attacker's goals: The attacker is attempting a man-in-the-middle NTLM relay attack to intercept authentication attempts and move laterally within an environment.
    Investigative actions: Check that the alerted host is not a NAT or a proxy that duplicates traffic as part of its normal behavior. Check if the protocols used are vulnerable to an NTLM relay attack (e.g. LDAP, SMB). Ensure that SMB signing is enabled in the case of a possible SMB relay attack.
  • Possible Distributed File System Namespace Management (DFSNM) abuse High

    A possible abuse of Distributed File System Namespace Management (DFSNM).

    Activation:
    14 Days
    Training:
    30 Days
    Test:
    N/A (single event)
    Deduplication:
    1 Day
    ATT&CK tactics: Credential Access (TA0006)
    ATT&CK techniques: Forced Authentication (T1187) Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay (T1557.001)
    Required data: XDR Agent with eXtended Threat Hunting (XTH)
    Attacker's goals: An attacker can abuse the Distributed File System Namespace Management protocol to coerce an authentication from a DC. This authentication can later be used for obtaining a DC certificate for DCSync.
    Investigative actions: Check for a suspicious process on the initiator. Check if the source host is a vulnerability scanner. Look for unusual AD CS certificate requests. Check for possible DCSync alerts.
  • Possible authentication coercion Informational Identity Analytics 2 variations

    An unusual Remote Procedure Call (RPC) was made to potentially cause authentication coercion.

    Activation:
    14 Days
    Training:
    30 Days
    Test:
    N/A (single event)
    Deduplication:
    1 Day
    ATT&CK tactics: Credential Access (TA0006)
    ATT&CK techniques: Forced Authentication (T1187) Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay (T1557.001)
    Required data: XDR Agent with eXtended Threat Hunting (XTH)
    Attacker's goals: An attacker can abuse Remote Procedure Calls to coerce authentication from servers.
    Investigative actions: Check for a suspicious process on the initiator. Check if the source host is a vulnerability scanner. Check for unusual connections from {actor_remote_ip} to other servers in the network. Check for logged-in users to {actor_remote_ip} and investigate their actions. Check for indicators of compromise on {actor_remote_ip}.

    Variations

    Possible authentication coercion from an unconstrained delegation server to a sensitive server

    Medium overridden

    An unusual Remote Procedure Call (RPC) was made towards a sensitive server, to potentially cause authentication coercion. overridden

    Possible authentication coercion to a sensitive server

    Low overridden

    An unusual Remote Procedure Call (RPC) was made towards a sensitive server, to potentially cause authentication coercion. overridden

  • Possible new DHCP server Medium

    A DHCP response was sent from an unknown DHCP server.Attackers may send a DHCP response to a host in his LAN to inject a DNS server, route or WPAD server.

    Activation:
    14 Days
    Training:
    30 Days
    Test:
    N/A (single event)
    Deduplication:
    1 Day
    ATT&CK tactics: Credential Access (TA0006)
    ATT&CK techniques: Adversary-in-the-Middle (T1557)
    Required data: XDR Agent
    Attacker's goals: The attacker is attempting a man-in-the-middle NTLM relay attack to intercept authentication attempts and move laterally within an environment.
    Investigative actions: Check if the source agent is a legitimate DHCP server. Check if the attacked host send DNS queries to an unusual IP. Check if the attacked host send WPAD HTTP/S requests to an unusual host.
  • Potential NTLM Relay Attack Informational Identity Analytics 3 variations

    Multiple NTLM authentications were made to the same workstation and user from different IPs.This might indicate a potential NTLM Relay attack.

    Activation:
    14 Days
    Training:
    30 Days
    Test:
    10 Minutes
    Deduplication:
    1 Day
    ATT&CK tactics: Credential Access (TA0006) Lateral Movement (TA0008)
    ATT&CK techniques: Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay (T1557.001) Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash (T1550.002)
    Required data: XDR Agent
    Attacker's goals: The attacker is attempting a man-in-the-middle NTLM relay attack to intercept authentication attempts and move laterally within an environment.
    Investigative actions: Ensure that the alerted host is not a NAT device or proxy that replicates or forwards network traffic as part of its expected operational behavior. Check if the workstation supports weak, outdated versions of NTLM. Check for network activity to and from the suspicious IP address and workstation, to verify if they were compromised. Check for process activity to and from the suspicious IP address to verify if it was compromised. Check for changes in the network configurations, including indicators of poisoning attacks. Monitor closely the actions of the potentially compromised user account for any anomalous behavior.

    Variations

    NTLM Relay Attack using a sensitive user and a vulnerable package

    Medium overridden

    Multiple NTLM authentications were made to the same workstation and sensitive user from different IPs using a vulnerable NTLM package.This might indicate a potential NTLM Relay attack. overridden

    Potential NTLM Relay Attack using a vulnerable package

    Low overridden

    Multiple NTLM authentications were made to the same workstation and user from different IPs using a vulnerable NTLM package.This might indicate a potential NTLM Relay attack. overridden

    Potential NTLM Relay Attack using a sensitive user

    Low overridden

    Multiple NTLM authentications were made to the same workstation and sensitive user from different IPs.This might indicate a potential NTLM Relay attack. overridden

  • Potential NTLM Relay Attack against a Microsoft Configuration Manager Site Server Informational Identity Analytics 1 variation

    Multiple NTLM authentications were made to the same Microsoft Configuration Manager site server and user from different IPs in a short period of time.This might indicate a potential NTLM Relay attack.

    Activation:
    14 Days
    Training:
    30 Days
    Test:
    10 Minutes
    Deduplication:
    1 Day
    ATT&CK tactics: Credential Access (TA0006) Lateral Movement (TA0008)
    ATT&CK techniques: Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay (T1557.001) Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash (T1550.002)
    Required data: XDR Agent
    Detector tags: Microsoft SCCM Analytics
    Attacker's goals: An attacker may coerce the SCCM site server to authenticate to a malicious host and relay it to escalate privileges and move laterally across site systems.
    Investigative actions: Ensure that the alerted host is not a NAT device or proxy that replicates or forwards network traffic as part of its expected operational behavior. Check if the protocols used are vulnerable to an NTLM relay attack (e.g. LDAP, SMB). Ensure that SMB signing is enabled in the case of a possible SMB relay attack. Check for network activity to and from the suspicious IP address to verify if it is a compromised machine. Monitor closely the actions of the potentially compromised user account for any anomalous behavior, especially suspicious SCCM-related activity occurring near the time of the alert.

    Variations

    Potential NTLM Relay Attack against a Microsoft Configuration Manager Site Server using a vulnerable package

    Low overridden

    Multiple NTLM authentications were made to the same Microsoft Configuration Manager site server and user from different IPs using a vulnerable NTLM package in a short period of time.This might indicate a potential NTLM Relay attack. overridden

  • Uncommon WPAD queries Informational 3 variations

    There were multiple attempts to access WPAD resources by a single host in your network. This may indicate a malicious activity.

    Activation:
    14 Days
    Training:
    30 Days
    Test:
    1 Hour
    Deduplication:
    1 Day
    ATT&CK tactics: Credential Access (TA0006)
    ATT&CK techniques: Adversary-in-the-Middle (T1557)
    Required data: Palo Alto Networks Firewall EAL Logs XDR Agent
    Attacker's goals: Attackers may attempt to move laterally over the network by exploiting problems in WPAD.
    Investigative actions: Verify that the source host is legitimate. Examine the legitimacy of the application that produced this uncommon WPAD. Examine the parent process of this application.

    Variations

    Uncommon WPAD queries to a external domain

    Informational overridden

    There were multiple attempts to access WPAD resources by a single host in your network. This may indicate a malicious activity. overridden

    Suspicious WPAD queries

    Low overridden

    There were multiple attempts to access WPAD resources by a single host in your network. This may indicate a malicious activity. overridden

    Uncommon WPAD queries using an uncommon port

    Informational overridden

    There were multiple attempts to access WPAD resources by a single host in your network. This may indicate a malicious activity. overridden

  • Unusual Encrypting File System Remote call (EFSRPC) to domain controller Low Identity Analytics 3 variations

    An unusual Encrypting File System Remote call (EFSRPC) was made to a domain controller.

    Activation:
    14 Days
    Training:
    30 Days
    Test:
    N/A (single event)
    Deduplication:
    1 Day
    ATT&CK tactics: Credential Access (TA0006)
    ATT&CK techniques: Forced Authentication (T1187) Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay (T1557.001)
    Required data: XDR Agent with eXtended Threat Hunting (XTH)
    Attacker's goals: An attacker can abuse the Encrypting File System Remote Protocol to coerce authentication from a DC. This authentication can later be used for obtaining a DC certificate for DCSync.
    Investigative actions: Check for a suspicious process on the initiator. Check if the source host is a vulnerability scanner. Check for unusual connections from the server of the requested file location (it may be a relay server). Look for unusual AD CS certificate requests. Look for following suspicious connections using the DC machine account. Check for possible DCSync alerts.

    Variations

    A suspicious Encrypting File System Remote call (EFSRPC) was made to a domain controller

    Medium overridden

    An unusual Encrypting File System Remote call (EFSRPC) was made to a domain controller. overridden

    Abnormal Encrypting File System Remote call (EFSRPC) to domain controller using EfsRpcFileKeyInfo for the first time

    Low overridden

    An abnormal EfsRpcFileKeyInfo Encrypting File System Remote call (EFSRPC) was made to a domain controller for the first time. overridden

    Abnormal Encrypting File System Remote call (EFSRPC) to domain controller using EfsRpcFileKeyInfo

    Informational overridden

    An abnormal EfsRpcFileKeyInfo Encrypting File System Remote call (EFSRPC) was made to a domain controller. overridden